The ‘left-turn’ and the support for pro-poor income growth in Latin America With Rosario Queirolo and Santiago López Cariboni
Abstract: It is common wisdom that class cleavages are electorally weak in Latin America and valence explanations such as economic voting receive stronger empirical support. Yet, an important problem in unequal democracies is the extent to which voters make redistributive considerations when rewarding/punishing governments for economic growth. In this paper we analyze the evolution of class-biased economic voting (CBEV), this is, the recent electoral rewards for top-income growth relative to mean income growth, in the most unequal continent in the world. The theory predicts that left-wing parties that commit to income redistribution are likely to attenuate class-bias economic voting. Moreover, left parties may even obtain electoral gains from pro-poor income growth among the poor. This suggests that some of the left-wing Latin American parties that have implemented pro-poor policies obtained the support of the disadvantaged. We analyze survey data from 18 democracies of Latin America before and after the `left turn’ (1996-2019). Our theory and empirical results contribute to the little existing knowledge on whether the wave of left-wing mandates in the continent has in fact contributed to better align distributive preferences and voting behavior.